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ABSTRACT 
Across the spectrum of ideas debated within the law of democracy, the 
view is nearly unanimous that the Justices must lead the way toward a better 
democracy.  And yet, as we argue in this Essay, the Court’s handling of the 
problems since its initial intervention in Baker v. Carr has been nothing 
short of a mess.  Debates in this area offer modern instances of a Court that 
cares little about doctrinal consistency and judicial craftsmanship, of Justic-
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es that care less about compromise and common ground and more about 
expressing their deeply held views about politics, democracy, and the law.  
In response, we look back to the debate between Justices Brennan and 
Frankfurter over the wisdom of judicial intervention.  And to our minds, this 
is a debate with a clear winner: to this day, Justice Frankfurter’s forceful 
argument has gone both unheeded and unanswered.  The evidence is in, and 
so, after forty years of judicial review in the realm of politics, the question 
for the future should be whether judicial intervention in the realm of politics 
is worth the cost.   
“This Court seems incapable of admitting that some matters—any matters—
are none of its business.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
“If democracy consisted only in the desire of people to express what is 
on their minds and the willingness of their leaders to respond to those de-
sires,” writes Alan Wolfe, “American democracy today would be a cause 
for celebration.”2  Yet democracy is far more complicated than that, and 
Wolfe makes clear that the quality of democracy, as practiced in the United 
States, is seriously wanting.3  The data is plentiful.  At the micro-level, citi-
zens are apathetic and disengaged and voters know very little about politics.  
At the macro-level, accountability from elected officials is lacking, mediat-
ing institutions such as political parties and interest groups are viewed with 
distrust, and neutral bodies such as the media and administrative agencies 
are no longer driven by the public good but in accordance with the prefe-
rences of the party in power.4 
The fashionable way out of this condition—arguably the only way—
points to the U.S. Supreme Court.  Across the spectrum of ideas debated 
within the law of democracy, the view is nearly unanimous that the Justices 
must lead the way toward a better democracy.  Consider in this vein the 
debate at the heart of the law of democracy, between advocates of judicial 
intervention in defense of individual rights (the “individualists”) and those 
who advocate for judicial intervention as a corrective measure for structural 
flaws (the “structuralists”).  Both sides find common ground in their view 
that the Court must play an important role in this area.  Curiously, they also 
agree that the opposing camp is misguided and ultimately expects too much 
from the Court.  According to Rick Hasen, a leading individualist, the struc-
turalists “evince judicial hubris, a belief that judges appropriately should be 
  
 1. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). 
 2. ALAN WOLFE, DOES AMERICAN DEMOCRACY STILL WORK? 12 (2006). 
 3. See id. at 14. 
 4. See id. 
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cast in the role of supreme political regulators.”5  In contrast, Rick Pildes, a 
leading structuralist, worries that a turn to rights in this area might “Loch-
nerize the very design of democratic institutions.”6  Both camps thus aim to 
provide a space for the Court to intervene in politics, while simultaneously 
minimizing its effects.   
These are legitimate concerns.  Take any issue, from partisan gerry-
mandering and minority vote dilution to campaign finance or the Voting 
Rights Act.  Each of these debates offers modern instances of a Court that 
cares little about doctrinal consistency, judicial craftsmanship, and com-
promise or common ground.  Instead, the Justices seem to care more about 
expressing their deeply held views about politics, democracy, and the law.  
The opinions in these cases are so confused and confusing that scholars can 
hardly make sense of them; or, as Heather Gerken explained in the wake of 
LULAC,7 the Texas gerrymandering case, “The authors’ interpretations of 
LULAC are so different that at times one wonders whether they were read-
ing the same opinion.”8  But do not take our word for it.  According to Pam 
Karlan: 
Sixty years after Justice Frankfurter warned his colleagues “not to enter this politi-
cal thicket,” the Court is embroiled in the thicket more than ever.  Part of the rea-
sons for the current inconsistency in the doctrine are the very real tensions that any 
jurisprudence of politics must navigate: among stability, robust competition, and 
protection of minority groups; between protecting individual rights and promoting 
institutional arrangements that fairly reflect group interests; and between anti-
entrenchment and anti-discrimination models of judicial intervention.  As long as 
money and race remain salient in American politics—and it’s hard to imagine ei-
ther fading away any time soon—judicial intervention will remain both necessary, 
and necessarily dicey.9 
Unquestionably, the law of democracy is messy and contested.  A 
much better question is whether this is an inevitable consequence of judicial 
review in this volatile area, or whether the Court is up to something else.  Is 
the cure worse than the disease itself?  Or, is judicial intervention, no matter 
how divided and inconsistent, a necessary component of American-style 
democracy? 
One answer suggests that all these questions—and the Court’s appar-
ent incoherence—can be summarily explained as an institutional strategy to 
  
 5. RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING 
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 13 (2003). 
 6. Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term – Foreword: The Constitu-
tionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 48 (2004). 
 7. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
 8. Heather K. Gerken, Rashomon and the Roberts Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1213, 
1214 (2007) [hereinafter Gerken, Rashomon]. 
 9. Pamela S. Karlan, New Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law of Democracy, 68 
OHIO ST. L.J. 743, 766 (2007). 
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hold the doctrine in place until the Court finds a coherent way out of the 
muddle.  As elegantly and forcefully argued by Professor Gerken, the Court 
is in a holding pattern—essentially “treading water” before a new coalition 
emerges to infuse a much needed coherence into the law of democracy.10  
She labels the current state of the law “a doctrinal interregnum” and ex-
plains it as follows: “The Court seems to sense the imminence of a para-
digm shift, but it is not sure where the next analytic road will lead.  It is thus 
content with going through the motions, patching the holes in the existing 
foundation, holding the doctrinal edifice together a little while longer.”11  
Aware that its existing paradigm is no longer useful and has reached “an 
intellectual dead end,”12 the Court is “staying put” while it waits for a cohe-
sive majority to emerge. 
This is an intriguing account of the present state of the law of democ-
racy.  And who knows, it may well be the case that this doctrinal incohe-
rence is part of a larger strategy on the part of the Court.  To our minds, 
however, the law of democracy and the Court’s role in shaping it have 
changed very little from the moment the Court began to regulate these ques-
tions in Baker v. Carr.13  What we see today is not very different from what 
we saw thirty years ago.  Consider, for example, Justice Harlan’s words in 
his separate opinion in Whitcomb v. Chavis, decided in 1971:  
The suggestion implicit in the Court’s opinion that [plaintiffs] may ultimately pre-
vail if they can make their record in these and other like respects should be recog-
nized for what it is: a manifestation of frustration by a Court that has become 
trapped in the “political thicket” and is looking for the way out. 
This case is nothing short of a complete vindication of Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s 
warning nine years ago “of the mathematical quagmire (apart from divers judicial-
ly inappropriate and elusive determinants) into which this Court today catapults the 
lower courts of the country.”  With all respect, it also bears witness to the morass 
into which the Court has gotten itself by departing from sound constitutional prin-
ciple in the electoral field.14 
As the Court continues to struggle with its handling of questions of 
democracy, we ask the one question missing from modern debates about the 
Court and its role in regulating our politics: is it time to reconsider the 
Court’s return to the political question regime of old, where the Court 
  
 10. Gerken, Rashomon, supra note 8, at 1213 (noting that the “doctrinal interregnum 
continues” with the Roberts Court); see Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The 
Court, Election Law, and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 PA. L. REV. 503, 504, 515-16 
(2004) [hereinafter Gerken, Lost] (noting that the Court is “in a doctrinal holding pattern, 
unsure of where to go next”). 
 11. Gerken, Lost, supra note 10, at 516-17. 
 12. Id. at 505. 
 13. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 14. 403 U.S. 124, 170 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186, 268 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)) (internal citation omitted). 
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played no role in reigning in the excesses of politics?  As the leading camps 
within the law of democracy jostle for supremacy while simultaneously 
deriding their critics as advocates of judicial activism, it might be well 
worth remembering that a third option once existed.  Even if one is ambiva-
lent—as we are—about returning the Court to the world pre-1961, it might 
be time to at least consider a third option. 
This Essay develops this argument in the course of three Parts.  Part I 
sketches the modern debate over the role of the Court in our constitutional 
universe.  One model focuses on the question of who should have the ulti-
mate authority to interpret the Constitution.  The claim here, as recently 
examined by Larry Kramer, argues that the Rehnquist Court embraced the 
notion of judicial supremacy.  This is a view of the Court as aggressive, 
muscular, and supreme.  A second model looks to the question of when the 
Court should intervene in difficult social and political controversies.  The 
argument here is based on Alexander Bickel’s notion of the “passive vir-
tues,” and presents a view of the Court as prudential, pragmatic, and attuned 
to social and political realities.  Finally, a third model largely focuses on 
how the Court should decide cases once it accepts them for review.  This 
model is associated with Cass Sunstein’s concept of “judicial minimalism.”  
A minimalist court must issue narrow and shallow opinions in order to al-
low the disagreeing parties enough room for reaching consensus. 
Part II argues that the Court’s modern performance is in line with its 
traditional behavior in the field.  There is nothing new here.  This Part uses 
the short history of the minority vote dilution cases as a case study.  We 
choose this area of the law for an important reason.  As the Supreme Court 
continues to demonstrate deep ambivalence about the constitutionality of 
the Voting Rights Act, there may come a time in the near future when these 
cases will once again return to prominence.  Our discussion highlights their 
importance in the development of the law while foreshadowing their likely 
resurgence. 
Finally, Part III asks the obvious question: is the Court’s intervention 
in our politics worth the cost?  Or is it time to advocate for the Court’s exit 
from the famed political thicket?  In 1961, Justices Brennan and Frankfurter 
could only debate hypothetically the issues at the heart of the Court’s choice 
to enter the field of politics.  Close to half a century later, and evidence in 
hand, we look back to that important debate.  Again, while it is clear to us 
that Justice Frankfurter has won the argument by a wide margin, we do not 
think that the Court must overturn Baker v. Carr.  But at the very least, we 
must take the argument seriously.  The Court’s incoherent regulation of our 
democracy demands no less. 
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I. THREE FACES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: A CONTINUUM 
An institution faced with a difficult question may first choose to act; 
or, instead, it may choose to do nothing.  Once it chooses to act, it may 
choose to do so assertively or cautiously, depending upon the circumstances 
in question.  These choices may be set as part of a continuum, with action 
and inaction being polar extremes. 
Accounts of the judicial function may be set along a similar conti-
nuum.  This Part briefly catalogues three leading accounts, as initially de-
veloped by prominent constitutional theorists in the prestigious Supreme 
Court Forewords to the Harvard Law Review.15  One end finds a strong ver-
sion of judicial supremacy, of a Court that acts with much confidence, per-
haps hubris.  Many scholars posit the Court precisely here, willing and able 
to aggrandize its own power vis-à-vis the political branches.16  Strands of 
this argument place the demise of the political questions doctrine at the 
heart of the Court’s newfound posture, though its reach is seen across my-
riad doctrinal arenas.  The opposite end finds calls for judicial inaction 
grounded in prudence and the “passive virtues.”   
Recent calls for a jurisprudence of “judicial minimalism” fall between 
these two extremes.17  This is a view of the Court as restrained, its rulings 
narrow and shallow, going no farther than necessary.  In particular, some 
influential accounts posit the Rehnquist Court circa 2004 as a minimalist 
Court.18 
  
 15. See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term – Foreword: We the 
Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995, Term – 
Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, 
Leaving Things]; Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term – Foreword: The 
Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). 
 16. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 15; Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than 
Court?  The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002). 
 17. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Smallest Court in the Land, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2004, 
at WK9 [hereinafter Sunstein, Smallest Court].  See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE 
AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ONE 
CASE].  This characterization intends to encompass both Sunstein’s position and that of the 
“original minimalist manifesto.” Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimal-
ism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454, 1457 (2000).  See Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the 
Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doc-
trine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203, 1233 (2002) (labeling Sunstein “Bickel’s jurisprudential heir”).  
Peters includes Michael Dorf, Richard Fallon, Robert Burt, Neal Katyal, and Neal Devins 
within the “minimalist” school.  See Peters, supra, at 1466-74.  Dorf, for one, disputes the 
characterization.  See Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 887 n.36 (2003). 
 18. See Sunstein, Leaving Things, supra note 15, at 6; cf. Bickel, supra note 15, at 
40, 51 (“It happens that a number of this Term’s most celebrated cases were as significant for 
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A. Judicial Hubris: A “Muscular” Supremacy, Turning to Sovereignty 
In his recent Harvard Law Review Foreword, Larry Kramer placed the 
notion of judicial supremacy at the heart of his contribution.  His thesis ex-
amined the widespread acceptance of judicial supremacy by all relevant 
political and constitutional actors.19  As he wrote, “in the years since Cooper 
v. Aaron, the idea of judicial supremacy—the notion that judges have the 
last word when it comes to constitutional interpretation and that their deci-
sions determine the meaning of the Constitution for everyone—has finally 
found widespread approbation.”20  Even among scholars who criticize and 
disapprove of this role, Kramer concluded, “the Court remains the preemi-
nent institution in establishing constitutional meaning.”21 
The argument here is that the Rehnquist Court anointed itself as pree-
minent constitutional interpreter, the last word on matters of constitutional 
interpretation.22  The quintessential buck stops right at the steps of the Su-
preme Court building.  All other relevant actors, from the President to Con-
gress to the states, must play a secondary role.23 
Placed in historical context, this argument often begins with Chief Jus-
tice Marshall’s claim in Marbury that it is “emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”24  It also includes 
Cooper’s axiom that the Court is “supreme in the exposition of the law of 
the Constitution.”25  Modern examples of this position are many, and Kra-
mer offers his share.  The obvious ones are City of Boerne v. Flores,26 where 
the Court rejected congressional attempts to overrule a recent Court deci-
  
having brought into focus the uses and nonuses of techniques of withholding ultimate consti-
tutional adjudication, as for having wrought changes in substantive law.”). 
 19. Kramer, supra, note 15.  Kramer is not alone in making this observation, as 
noted above.  See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE 
COURTS (1999); L.A. Powe, Jr., The Politics of American Judicial Review: Reflections on the 
Marshall, Warren, and Rehnquist Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 697 (2003). 
 20. Kramer, supra note 15, at 6. 
 21. Id. at 8. 
 22. See also Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal 
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000). 
 23. This Part implies neither agreement with nor universal acceptance of Kramer’s 
claims.  As to the latter, scholars have obviously challenged some of the views described 
here.  See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Judicial Supremacy and Its Discontents, 20 CONST. 
COMMENT. 405 (2003); Marci A. Hamilton, Nine Shibboleths of the New Federalism, 47 
WAYNE L. REV. 931 (2001). 
 24. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 25. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
 26. 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also Michael W. McConnell, Comment, Institutions 
and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 163 
(1997) (contending that the Court in Boerne “adopted the most judge-centered view of con-
stitutional law since Cooper v. Aaron”). 
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sion under its Section 5 power; United States v. Lopez,27 where the Court 
struck down a congressional enactment on Commerce Clause grounds;28 the 
various Commerce Clause cases of the 1990s, which, Kramer argues, essen-
tially foreclose the judgment of Congress in this area;29 and the mother of all 
judicial supremacy cases, Bush v. Gore.30   
Kramer offers brief, yet choice words for Bush.  Readers likely recall 
the Court’s seemingly apologetic words about intervening in the election: 
None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority than are the 
Members of this Court, and none stand more in admiration of the Constitution’s 
design to leave the selection of the President to the people, through their legisla-
tures, and to the political sphere.  When contending parties invoke the process of 
the courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal 
and constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.31 
Kramer has very little patience for this passage: “These sentiments, 
coming as they do immediately after the Court’s brute exercise of authority 
to halt the recount, have a ‘they doth protest too much, methinks’ quality 
about them.  Unsought responsibility?!  Forced to confront?!”32  The initial 
question was one of institutional responsibility, of locating the proper forum 
to decide this electoral question.  To Kramer, the answer was simple:  
“Nothing kept the Justices from ruling that the Supreme Court was not the 
proper forum in which to decide a presidential election.  Nothing in the law, 
that is.”33 
Under procedures and doctrines then in effect, and once it decided to 
see the case to its conclusion, the Court had two options at its disposal.  On 
the question of Florida law, the Court should have returned the case to the 
Florida Supreme Court.  But the Court had no intention of doing any such 
thing.  “Having determined to prevent [returning the case to the Florida Su-
preme Court] at all costs, the Justices in the majority had no choice but to 
lie, fabricating a transparently phony claim to be following the lead of the 
Florida Supreme Court.”34  Ultimately, a second option might have included 
  
 27. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 28. See J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. 
L. REV. 97, 151 & n.193 (1988) (observing that the Court consistently—absent one case, 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)—deferred to Congress under the 
Commerce Clause from 1937 to 1995). 
 29. See Kramer, supra note 15, at 145. 
 30. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 31. Id. at 111. 
 32. Kramer, supra note 15, at 156. 
 33. Id.; see also HASEN, supra note 5, at 9 (“The lament was disingenuous because 
the Court could have declined to hear the case not once but twice.”); Powe, supra note 19, at 
731 (“The responsibility, far from being unsought, was one the justices had been demanding 
for a decade by their imperialism in displacing and disparaging other constitutional interpre-
ters.”). 
 34. Kramer, supra note 15, at 155-56. 
Summer] Leaving the Thicket at Last? 425 
 
a larger role for Congress.35  Yet, Kramer writes, “[n]othing jumps off the 
pages of the opinion quite so starkly as the majority’s evident determination 
to call a halt to things before Congress could get its hands on the prob-
lem.”36 
After Bush v. Gore, scholars contend that very little remains of the po-
litical question doctrine.  Or so it appears.  If the facts in this case do not 
warrant that the Court step aside, it is hard to see what facts might so war-
rant.  This is another way of saying that a tension exists between the politi-
cal question doctrine, which demands judicial humility and passivity, and 
the Court’s modern view of its power and its place in our constitutional 
world as supreme interpreter.  These two positions cannot co-exist.  And 
according to some commentators, they no longer do.  “It is hardly surpris-
ing,” Rachel Barkow writes, “that the Court has opted for the course that 
aggrandizes its own power.”37  Kramer poses a similar issue in closing his 
provocative Article: “The Supreme Court has made its grab for power.  The 
question is: will we let them get away with it?”38 
In sum, this judicial posture is strong, muscular, and supreme.  It is the 
posture of a Court not worried about minor details, but committed to assert-
ing its authority across spheres and boundaries.  It is the posture of a confi-
dent Court, sure of its place in the constitutional cosmos and unafraid to flex 
its considerable muscle.  This posture, according to Kramer, is far more than 
judicial supremacy; it is “judicial sovereignty.”39 
B. Judicial Humility: Of Prudence, the “Passive Virtues” and Political 
Questions 
But the Court was not always so confident and assertive.  Writing in 
the wake of the Warren Court’s Brown revolution, and during a lull prior to 
the judicial tempest of the mid-1960s, Alexander Bickel’s own Foreword 
tells a story far different from Kramer’s account.  In fairness, his concerns 
  
 35. See Guido Calabresi, In Partial (but not Partisan) Praise of Principle, in BUSH V. 
GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 67, 68 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002) (contending that 
one approach to Bush v. Gore would have been to “[l]et the House and Senate do their job”); 
Elizabeth Garrett, Leaving the Decision to Congress, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE 
SUPREME COURT 38, 48-54 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001); Laurence H. 
Tribe, Comment, EROG v. HSUB and its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of 
Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 277-78 (2001) (“There is a powerful case indeed for the 
Court playing no role other than to protect Congress’s decisionmaking function—that is, for 
treating the matter as a political question textually committed to Congress under the Twelfth 
Amendment, rather than a legal question properly resolved by a court.  The requisite textual 
commitment to a political branch could hardly be clearer.”). 
 36. Kramer, supra note 15, at 154. 
 37. Barkow, supra note 16, at 242. 
 38. Kramer, supra note 15, at 169. 
 39. Id. at 158. 
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were unlike those faced by constitutional theorists today.  Bickel had seen 
Brown first-hand and had played a direct role in its outcome.  He also wit-
nessed the Southern response and the Court’s own rejoinder in Cooper v. 
Aaron.40  These experiences raised a different set of concerns for Bickel.  
Rather than worry about the Court’s undemocratic pedigree, Bickel worried 
about the Court’s power and the reception its rulings would receive at the 
hands of a recalcitrant public.41  This meant that the Court could not issue its 
rulings in a vacuum, irrespective of contrary public opinion and localized 
opposition.  Instead, the Court must know when to act and when to stay its 
hand.  In so doing, it must be mindful of political considerations when de-
ciding cases.  In his own words, “the techniques and allied devices for stay-
ing the Court’s hand . . . mark the point at which the Court gives the elec-
toral institutions their head and itself stays out of politics, and there is noth-
ing paradoxical in finding that here the Court is most a political animal.”42 
This is an account of a cautious Court, a Court that cannot assume ac-
quiescence to its rulings.  This is not a weak Court, by any means, but rather 
a Court that, while grounded in principle, was cognizant of the political 
realities of its day.  The Supreme Court’s handling of the Virginia miscege-
nation case soon after Brown, Naim v. Naim,43 afforded Bickel a clear ex-
ample of his thesis.  The infamous edict in Brown II, exhorting compliance 
with Brown I at “all deliberate speed,” provided him another, and Bickel 
spent many pages in The Least Dangerous Branch making precisely this 
claim.44  In both instances, the Court retreats in the face of rabid Southern 
opposition.45  And yet, according to Bickel, what choice did the Court really 
have?  As he wrote: 
  
 40. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (proclaiming that the Court is “supreme in the exposition 
of the law of the Constitution”). 
 41. See Tushnet, supra note 17, at 1229. 
 42. Bickel, supra note 15, at 51. 
 43. 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam), vacating and remanding 87 S.E.2d 749, on 
remand, 90 S.E.2d 849; 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam), motion to recall mandate denied 
per curiam, 350 U.S. 985 (1956). 
 44. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 247-54 (2d ed. 1986). 
 45. In Naim, the Court faced a constitutional challenge to a Virginia anti-
miscegenation statute.  This was, according to Michael Klarman, “the last case the justices 
wished to see on their docket in 1955.”  MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL 
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 321 (2004) (“Many 
southern whites had charged that the real goal of the NAACP’s school desegregation cam-
paign was ‘to open the bedroom doors of our white women to the Negro men’ and ‘to mon-
grelize the white race.’  To strike down antimiscegenation laws so soon after Brown risked 
appearing to validate those suspicions.  Moreover, opinion polls in the 1950s revealed that 
over 90 percent of whites, even outside of the South, opposed interracial marriage.”).  And so 
five Justices “swallowed their collective pride and voted to dismiss the appeal on the ground 
that the Virginia court’s response ‘leaves the case devoid of a properly presented federal 
question.’”  Id. at 323.  Klarman concluded that “[a] majority of the justices apparently pre-
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[W]ould it have been wise, at a time when the Court had just pronounced its new 
integration principle, when it was subject to scurrilous attack by men who pre-
dicted that integration of the schools would lead directly to “mongrelization of the 
race” and that this was the result the Court had really willed, would it have been 
wise, just then, in the first case of its sort, on an issue that the Negro community as 
a whole can hardly be said to be pressing hard at the moment, to declare that the 
states may not prohibit racial marriage?46 
Of course not, he argued.  To some, this signaled a Court caving in to 
public pressure and political considerations altogether foreign to constitu-
tional law.  To Bickel, the Court ignores these social realities at its peril.  
The Court must be prudential, principled, pragmatic, but not blind to social 
and political realities.47 
It was in this important sense that Bickel referred to the “passive vir-
tues.”  These were jurisdictional devices, “certain techniques of the mediat-
ing middle way,”48 that allow the Court to stay its hand when prudence de-
mands that it do so.  These were the traditional requirements of standing, 
case and controversy, ripeness, and the political question doctrine.  Bickel’s 
main contribution focused on these doctrinal tools; when “imaginatively 
utilized,”49 they would allow the Court to enter into a Socratic dialogue with 
the political branches and with society as a whole.  This meant for Bickel 
that the Court must not pursue principle at any and all costs, but rather, it 
must walk the thin line between principle and expediency.  In his mind, this 
was “the unique function of constitutional adjudication in the American 
system.”50 
The political question doctrine played a central role for Bickel.  For 
him, “[a]ny progression of instances when the final, constitutional judgment 
of the Supreme Court has been or should be withheld culminates naturally 
in the nebulous neighborhood of the doctrine of political questions.”51  If the 
neighborhood was nebulous in the early 1960s, the passage of time has done 
little to improve matters.52  For example, commentators debate whether such 
  
ferred to be humiliated at the hands of truculent state jurists rather than to stoke further the 
fires of racial controversy” ignited by Brown.  Id.  See also Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity 
and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948–1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 60-
66 (1979). 
 46. BICKEL, supra note 44, at 174. 
 47. For a defense of Bickel on some of these points, see Anthony T. Kronman, Al-
exander Bickel’s Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985).  For a well-known 
critique, see Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on 
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964). 
 48. Bickel, supra note 15, at 41. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 50. 
 51. Id. at 74. 
 52. See Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question,” 79 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1031, 1031 (1985) (“The doctrine has always proven to be an enigma to commenta-
tors.”). 
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a doctrine actually exists.53  And even if it does, some argue that the doc-
trine is “anemic,”54 or should “play no role whatsoever.”55  Commentators 
also disagree whether, as Bickel remarked, the doctrine “resists being do-
mesticated.”56  Finally, some commentators focus on what is known as the 
“classical” strand of the doctrine, and whether the “Constitution has com-
mitted to another agency of government [rather than the courts] the . . . de-
termination of the issue.”57  Others, such as Bickel, focus on what has been 
labeled the “prudential” strand.58  Be that as it may, it should be clear why 
the political question doctrine, as Bickel understood it, played a central role 
in his judicial schema.  A mere glance at the factors he offered as the basis 
for the doctrine should make this point amply clear: 
[T]he Court’s sense of lack of capacity, compounded in unequal parts of (a)  the 
strangeness of the issue and its intractability to principled resolution; (b) the sheer 
momentousness of it, which tends to unbalance judicial judgment; (c) the anxiety, 
not so much that judicial judgment will be ignored, as that perhaps it should be, but 
will not be; (d) finally and in sum (“in a mature democracy”), the inner vulnerabil-
ity, the self-doubt of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and has no 
earth to draw strength from.59 
Two reactions jump out immediately.  First, and in line with the pre-
vious discussion, Bickel envisioned a Court able and willing to sidestep 
controversies as necessary.  These factors clearly address the concern that 
the Court will overreach at times.  Second, this is a description of an an-
xious, vulnerable institution, not a self-assured and “muscular” one.  This 
description of the Court is no longer accurate,60 as these were the early 
  
 53. Compare Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE 
L.J. 597, 600 (1976) (suggesting that there is no political question doctrine), with Barkow, 
supra note 16, at 242 (suggesting there is a political question doctrine), and Redish, supra 
note 52, at 1032 (“[A] political question doctrine does in fact exist.”), and Louis Michael 
Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 441, 
441-42 (2004) (“[T]he political question doctrine is as central to modern constitutional adju-
dication as it was to the outcome in Marbury at the beginning of our constitutional history.”). 
 54. Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004, 92 CAL. L. REV. 959, 
966 (2004). 
 55. Redish, supra note 52, at 1033. 
 56. BICKEL, supra note 44, at 125; compare Seidman, supra note 53, at 442 (“My 
argument, then, is that the Court has never—and never can—develop constitutional rules that 
control the political judgments, as so understood, that it regularly makes.”), with Tushnet, 
supra note 17, at 1204 (disagreeing with the view that the political question doctrine “could 
not be reduced to rules, criteria, or even standards”). 
 57. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 8 (1959). 
 58. For a description and concomitant critique of the prudential strand, see Redish, 
supra note 52, at 1043-55. 
 59. BICKEL, supra note 44, at 184. 
 60. See Tushnet, supra note 17, at 1229-34. 
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1960s and the Court was still feeling the direct effects of the Brown deci-
sion.  Context made all the difference in the world. 
These factors (or “misgivings,” according to Bickel) are intended to 
guide the Court whether to intervene in a given controversy.  Of course 
these are not absolutes, but questions of degree.  And ultimately they add up 
to this: sometimes, questions are deemed political on the principled ground 
that the area should be governed without rules.  Or, according to Bickel, 
political questions involve “discretionary functions of the political institu-
tions, which are unprincipled on principle, because we think ‘that the job is 
better done without rules,’ and there is no reason why their legitimacy as 
such should not be affirmed by the Court.”61  His examples include, among 
others, whether the government recognizes foreign governments and unila-
teral abrogation of treaties. 
Alexander Bickel’s account of judicial review offers a cautious, pru-
dential Court that is aware of its limitations and the need to understand the 
context in which its rulings must be carried out.  Under Kramer’s descrip-
tive account, the Court does not fear anyone, and it knows it does not have 
to.  Bickel’s account is far different, for here the Court is willing to post-
pone difficult issues for a better day.  Prudence demands no other way. 
C. A Middle Ground?  Judicial Minimalism and the “Constructive Uses of 
Silence” 
In contrast to Kramer’s account of the Rehnquist Court and Bickel’s 
purportedly prudential account, Cass Sunstein’s Foreword offered a middle 
ground between a view of the Court as exclusive interpreter and a Court 
cognizant of its own limitations and its place in our constitutional un-
iverse.62  This is an account of a Court whose doctrines “serve to ensure 
against outcomes reached without sufficient accountability and reflecting 
factional power instead of reason-giving in the public domain.”63  Put a dif-
ferent way, the approach described here is “democracy-forcing,” in that it 
leaves issues open for democratic deliberation and promotes reason-giving.  
Tellingly, Sunstein “describe[s] the phenomenon . . . as ‘decisional mini-
malism.’”64  This approach is particularly sensible when the Court deals 
with highly complex issues or issues that divide the public.65 
  
 61. Bickel, supra note 15, at 76. 
 62. See Neal Devins, The Democracy-Forcing Constitution, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 
1993 (1999) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON 
THE SUPREME COURT (1999)) (“Sunstein’s call for narrow and shallow decisionmaking may 
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 63. Sunstein, Leaving Things, supra, note 15, at 8.  
 64. Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added).  For extensive analysis of judicial minimalism, see 
Sheldon Gelman, The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Minimalist, 89 GEO. L.J. 2297 (2001) 
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In line with these justifications, a minimalist judge eschews broad 
rules and theoretical abstractions, focusing instead only on the necessities of 
the case under consideration.  Like Bickel’s judge, a minimalist judge is a 
cautious judge, a strategic judge, and a pragmatic judge.66  It is a judge who 
sticks closely to precedents, a judge who deals in closely related hypotheti-
cal scenarios, a judge who acknowledges the unaccountable nature of her 
office and the primacy of the legislature, and a judge who looks for 
“grounds on which people can converge from diverse theoretical posi-
tions.”67  It is a judge who says only as much as necessary to justify a deci-
sion, and not a word more. 
These values translate into actual decisions in two central ways.  First, 
minimalism demands narrow, as opposed to wide, opinions.  This means 
simply that judges decide the case in front of them and do not attempt to 
decide other cases into the future.  They do not lay down broad rules.  Suns-
tein offers Romer v. Evans68 and United States v. Lopez69 as examples of 
narrow opinions.  Second, minimalist judges try not to tackle issues of basic 
principle head-on, but instead try to reach “incompletely theorized agree-
ments.”70  This does not mean that minimalist judges avoid giving reasons; 
instead, they offer “[r]easoned but theoretically unambitious accounts”71 and 
do not discuss first principles.  It is in this way that minimalist decisions are 
shallow, not deep.  In so doing, such decisions allow a disagreeing public to 
unite behind outcomes when they disagree about abstractions, or to agree 
about abstractions when agreement on outcomes is impossible.  They also 
allow the Justices to put their own disagreements to the side and agree on an 
outcome and a modest rationale in defense of their position.  Sunstein also 
catalogues Romer and Lopez under the “shallow” rubric. 
Thus, judicial minimalism finds a middle ground between aggressive 
review and judicial passivity.  While a minimalist court acts, it does so in 
shallow and narrow ways.  It is in this way that Sunstein’s account diverges 
  
(reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT (1999)); Peters, supra, note 17. 
 65. Bradley Canon refers to these as “politico-moral disputes.”  Bradley C. Canon, 
The Supreme Court as a Cheerleader in Politico-Moral Disputes, 54 J. POL. 637 (1992).  He 
defines these as issues for which the public perceives a right or wrong answer. 
 66. See Sunstein, Leaving Things, supra note 15, at 9 & n.8. 
 67. Id. at 15. 
 68. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).   
 69. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). But see Stephen M. Griffin, Has the Hour of Democracy 
Come Around at Last? The New Critique of Judicial Review, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 683, 690-
91 (2000) (contending that Lopez is not a minimalist decision; or at the very least, Sunstein 
does not make the case that it is); see also Gelman, supra note 64, at 2321 (criticizing Suns-
tein’s discussion of Lopez, because “[i]t misses Lopez’s significance by focusing narrowly on 
formal aspects of the opinion, ignoring what seems apparent to everyone else”). 
 70. Sunstein, Leaving Things, supra note 15, at 20. 
 71. Id. at 21. 
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from Bickel’s.  Yet, Sunstein acknowledges, the two projects are “easily 
linked.”72  For example, in specific reference to the debate over the political 
question doctrine, Sunstein might argue that the doctrine reduces the costs 
of decision while allowing the properly democratic actors the room needed 
to make their preferred choices.  It is in this way that Sunstein suggests that 
the “passive virtues” are best analyzed if seen as minimalist tools.  A mini-
malist judge may choose not to act as well. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 
These models of judicial intervention help tell the story of the devel-
opment of the law of democracy.  Within the space of a few years, the Court 
moved from non-intervention on prudential grounds (what we refer to as the 
Colegrove Era) to careful intervention (the Baker Era) to complete and ag-
gressive control of the field (the post-Reynolds Era).  The Court is now in 
charge of our politics, unabashed and unafraid.   
This is not a particularly newsworthy insight, yet no less important.  
Standing alone, the fact that the Court is now in control of our politics can 
be a good thing, particularly if one feels—as many do—that the political 
process often malfunctions and the Court must stand ready to strike a blow 
in defense of democratic values.73  But this insight does not stand alone; 
rather, it presses against the fact that the law of democracy is an incoherent 
mess, and that the Court is directly at fault in mishandling its regulation of 
the democratic process. 
It is as a way out of this quandary that Professor Gerken offered her 
theory of an interregnum, which posits the Court in a holding pattern, pa-
tiently waiting for a new majority to emerge before moving forward.74  The 
problem with this view is that the Court’s treatment of modern election law 
controversies is anything but “unique;” in fact, it might even be predictable.  
The Court has functioned in a disjointed manner since it first entered the 
political thicket.  Often, the doctrine is more confusing after the Court has 
“spoken.”75  We do not think that the Court is biding its time for a new ma-
jority to emerge; instead, individual Justices are struggling to deal with the 
difficult issues that inhere in this area, the same as they always have. 
  
 72. Id. at 51. 
 73. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: 
Reflections on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103 (2002). 
 74. Gerken, Rashomon, supra note 8, at 1213 (noting that the “doctrinal interregnum 
continues” with the Roberts Court); Gerken, Lost, supra note 10, at 504 (asserting that the 
Court is “in a doctrinal holding pattern, unsure of where to go next”). 
 75. See, e.g., Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050, 1071 (S.D. Ala. 1982) 
(showing that the district court found the Supreme Court’s opinion unclear as to whether to 
apply the effect or purpose test when considering the 1975 Amendment to § 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act). 
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For support, we could offer myriad doctrinal niches, from political and 
racial gerrymandering to pre-clearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act to campaign finance law.  This Part focuses on the Court’s treatment of 
minority vote dilution.  We conclude that the case law in this area is unclear 
and incoherent, no different from what we see in other areas of the law of 
democracy.  “Sloppy” opinions by Justices offering their individual notions 
on politics, democracy, and the law are the norm.  We further show that 
minority vote dilution was never “resolved” by the Court, despite the fact 
that the Court had numerous opportunities to put an end to the confusion.  
To this day, the doctrine remains in flux, as exemplified by the recent 
LULAC and Bartlett cases.  
The dilution question arose squarely in the 1960s, once the Court de-
cided—in Reynolds v. Sims—that “the right of suffrage can be denied by a 
debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as 
by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” 76  In so holding, 
the Court must then determine what mechanisms a state could—or could 
not—use to dilute the force of minority voters.  The question became par-
ticularly acute upon passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,77 when eligi-
ble black voters began to register in significant numbers.78  This increase in 
black registration resulted in, inter alia, the emergence of multi-member 
districts, devices that served to cancel out minority voting strength.79  Inte-
restingly, these devices were permitted—even encouraged—by the Court’s 
“one person, one vote” equal protection decisions of the 1960s.  These at-
large elections and multi-member districts allowed states to satisfy the con-
stitutional requirements of “one person, one vote” while “blunting the ef-
fects of rising black voting strength.”80  It would only be a matter of time 
  
 76. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1965). 
 77. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965). 
 78. Stanley A. Halpin, Jr., Beyond Vote Dilution: An Essay on Fair and Effective 
Representation in the American Democratic System, 22 S.U. L. REV. 99, 108 (1994). 
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ty.  In the South, it happened all too often. 
 80. Halpin, supra note 78, at 108. 
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before the Court examined the constitutionality of these attempts to dilute 
the black vote.81  
A. The Early Cases: Struggling to Apply Reynolds to Multi-Member Dis-
tricts 
The Court first addressed the validity of at-large elections in Fortson 
v. Dorsey,82 albeit in a vague and unclear manner.  The issue in Fortson was 
narrowly framed as an equal protection issue—whether “county-wide vot-
ing in the seven multi-district counties results in denying the residents there-
in a vote ‘approximately equal in weight to that of’ voters resident in the 
single-member constituencies.”83  The Court answered this question in the 
negative.  As it wrote, “[t]here is clearly no mathematical disparity.”84  This 
was not a remarkable conclusion; only a year earlier, the Court stated in 
Reynolds that single-member districts were not constitutionally required by 
the Equal Protection Clause.85  However, this was not to say that the claim 
was foreclosed from constitutional review.  As the Court further explained, 
“our opinion is not to be understood to say that in all instances or under all 
circumstances such a system as Georgia has will comport with the dictates 
of the Equal Protection Clause.”86  There might be times, the Court pro-
ceeded, that “designedly or otherwise, a multi-member constituency appor-
tionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case, would oper-
ate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political ele-
ments of the voting population.”87  When the case comes before it, the Court 
concluded in Fortson that the question would be considered.  Fortson was 
not such a case. 
This was a question that did not have to wait long to be answered.  In 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, the Court faced a challenge to a multi-member district 
in Marion County, Indiana, alleged to have the “force and effect” of diluting 
the vote of residents of certain segments within the county.88  In light of 
multi-member districts in general, the claim was rather simple.  The resi-
dents of the neighborhood in question—termed the “ghetto area”—were 
poor, and approximately two-thirds of them were black (Center Town-
  
 81. Id. at 108-09 (detailing how at-large elections in Louisiana were operated to 
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 82. 379 U.S. 433 (1965). 
 83. Id. at 436-37. 
 84. Id. at 437. 
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 86. Fortson, 379 U.S. at 439. 
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ship).89  The three-judge court first compared their political interests and 
found them quite distinct from those of wealthy whites and middle class 
blacks (Washington Township), groups found in two neighboring districts.  
More troubling, the numbers stacked squarely against them.  Looking at the 
five general assemblies elected from 1960 to 1968, the disparities were 
clear.  The court then compared the populations between districts, and the 
“ghetto area” once again came short; while its population was large enough 
to select two representatives and one senator under a single-member dis-
tricting system, it had been represented only once in the senate and three 
times in the house.  In contrast, the wealthier districts had been able to se-
lect representatives disproportionate to their overall population; even tract 
220, with only 0.66% of the county’s population, had selected more repre-
sentatives than the “ghetto area.”90  On these facts, the lower court con-
cluded that the multi-member district violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court was not impressed.  In an opinion authored by 
Justice White, the Court began its analysis by repeating its dictum in Fort-
son about the possibility of a successful challenge to a multi-member dis-
tricting plan, given the proper facts.  The Court also added, somewhat 
ominously, that “[w]e have not yet sustained such an attack.”91  Whitcomb 
would not be the first case to do so, for two reasons.  First, the Court echoed 
earlier warnings in explaining that only purposeful districting plans, either 
as conceived or as carried out, violate the Fourteenth Amendment.  On the 
facts here, the evidence did not support such a conclusion.   
Second, the Court turned to the population disparities and the argu-
ment that such disparities, standing alone, reflect the requisite discriminato-
ry purpose.92  The argument here was that the numbers speak for them-
selves, for, as the Court explained in Fortson, the multi-member plan oper-
ated to minimize and even cancel out the voting power of blacks.93  The 
Court did not accept this argument.94  To begin, it required specific evidence 
demonstrating that ghetto residents had in fact less opportunities to partici-
pate and elect representatives of their choice.95  In the Court’s view, none 
had been put forth: 
We have discovered nothing in the record or in the court’s findings indicating that 
poor Negroes were not allowed to register or vote, to choose the political party 
they desired to support, to participate in its affairs or to be equally represented on 
those occasions when legislative candidates were chosen.  Nor did the evidence 
purport to show or the court find that inhabitants of the ghetto were regularly ex-
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cluded from the slates of both major parties, thus denying them the chance of oc-
cupying legislative seats.96 
Instead, according to the Court, this case was not about race but poli-
tics.  Ghetto residents did not elect one of their own mainly because they 
generally identify more strongly with the Democratic Party; yet, Republi-
cans had won four of the last five elections.97  The Court concluded that the 
argument that the voting power of the residents of the Ghetto had been can-
celled out, “seems a mere euphemism for political defeat at the polls.”98 
Dissenting in part and concurring in the result in part, Justice Douglas, 
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, offered a different view of the 
constitutional standard in multi-member districting cases.  More specifical-
ly, he argued that a showing of racial motivation was not required in these 
cases; instead, the evidence on the record must only reflect an invidious 
effect.99  Yet, it is not entirely clear how an “effects” inquiry would be car-
ried out in the redistricting context short of enacting a proportional repre-
sentation system.  Advocates of this test must provide an answer to this 
question.  Justice Douglas does.  In partial agreement with the majority, 
Justice Douglas implied that this would be a fact-specific inquiry.100  For 
example, in Whitcomb, he agreed that the requisite invidious effect had been 
established on the strength of four findings:  
(1) the showing of an identifiable voting group living in Center Township, (2) the 
severe discrepancies of residency of elected members of the general assembly be-
tween Center and Washington Townships, . . . (3) the finding of pervasive influ-
ence of the county organizations of the political parties, and (4) the finding that 
legislators from the county maintain ‘common, undifferentiated’ positions on polit-
ical issues.101 
This was another way of saying that numbers alone will not be 
enough.  In order to prove the unconstitutionality of multi-member districts, 
more evidence than just mere disproportionate impact would be needed.  
The reach of Whitcomb was less than clear.  Did the Court really mean 
that multi-member districts could operate to dilute minority voting strength?  
The Court’s ominous statement that “[w]e have not yet sustained such an 
attack”102 might suggest otherwise.  And what were lower courts to make of 
the Court’s focus on access to the political process?  If minorities were “al-
lowed to register [and] vote, to choose the political party they desired to 
support, to participate in [governmental] affairs [and] to be equally 
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 100. Id. at 179. 
 101. Id.   
 102. Id. at 144. 
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represented on those occasions when legislative candidates were chosen,”103 
would a challenge fail?  And what did “allow,” “participate,” and “be equal-
ly represented” mean?  This confusion is seen in lower court opinions after 
Whitcomb. 
For example, in Kelly v. Bumpers,104 the lower court focused on the 
language in Whitcomb that indicated that access to the political process was 
all that was protected.  In the court’s words:  
The holding of the Supreme Court was that where minority groups are permitted to 
participate freely in the overall political process, they do not suffer unconstitutional 
discrimination simply because they may not be able to elect members of their own 
groups to the Legislature as they would be able to do if they were voting in a single 
member district or in single member districts. To put it another way, the Court held 
that the Constitution does not assure minorities, whether racial or political, propor-
tional representation or “safe seats” in the Legislature.105 
For this court, the focus was on the ability of minorities to participate, 
which it understood only as the formal act of voting. 
In contrast, the lower court in Howell v. Mahan,106 a case decided less 
than a month after Whitcomb, hardly discussed Whitcomb when it ruled on 
the constitutionality of a reapportionment plan adopted by the Virginia as-
sembly—a plan that included multi-member districts.107  To this court, it 
appeared that the issue was resolved in Whitcomb: multi-member districts 
were acceptable, as long as they were not “too ‘large.’”108  The court’s only 
discussion of Whitcomb was a recitation that multi-member districts are not 
unconstitutional.109  Judge Lewis, concurring in Howell, noted that the ob-
jections to large multi-member districts were “disposed of in the Indiana 
case.”110  He noted that it “hardly follows that a fifteen-member delegation 
is constitutionally permissible in Indiana and an eleven-member delegation 
is constitutionally impermissible in Virginia.”111  However, location might 
have everything to do with the permissibility of multi-member districts—at 
least in the early 1970s.  
Understandably, the Supreme Court returned to this issue soon after 
the Whitcomb decision.  The case was White v. Regester.112  In White, the 
  
 103. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149 (citation omitted). 
 104. 340 F. Supp. 568 (E.D. Ark. 1972). 
 105. Id. at 583 (citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 148-160 (1971)). 
 106. 330 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Va. 1971), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 410 U.S. 315 
(1973). 
 107. Id. at 1139. 
 108. Id. at 1146 (citing Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692 (1971)). 
 109. Howell, 330 F. Supp. at 1146 (noting that multi-member districts are “not per se 
unconstitutional”); id. at 1147 (finding multi-member districts in such cases are not unconsti-
tutional.). 
 110. Id. at 1148. 
 111. Id. 
 112. 412 U.S. 755 (1973). 
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Court was again presented with multi-member districts alleged to dilute 
minority voting strength, this time in south Texas.113  The Court changed 
course again, holding these multi-member districts invalid under the Consti-
tution.114  The White Court found that the district court properly relied on the 
“totality of the circumstances,”115 including the history of discrimination of 
Mexican-Americans in Bexar County (San Antonio, Texas) and blacks in 
Dallas County (Dallas, Texas)—the two multi-member districts at issue in 
the case—in reaching the determination that the multi-member districts vi-
olated the Constitution.116  The Court seemed to put great weight into two 
findings, which applied to both counties. 
First, the Court looked at Texas’ racial history and specifically its his-
tory of de jure racial discrimination.117  This is a history, the Court ex-
plained, that was often reflected in electoral arenas.118  Second, the Court 
looked to specific electoral practices and—in the case of Dallas County—
concluded that few blacks had been elected for state political office in Tex-
as, that the parties did very little to gain blacks’ general political support, 
and that representatives did not even attempt to further the interests of the 
black community.119  The crucial distinction between White and Whitcomb is 
thus the backdrop upon which their respective multi-member systems are 
reflected.  In this way, it seemed as though the South, with its Jim Crow 
legacy, provided much more fertile ground for these kinds of lawsuits.   
One lower court read White in this way, finding that the “complex-
ion”120 of North Dakota was such that the multi-member districts at issue did 
“not present any showing of unrepresented minorities or unresponsive rep-
resentatives.”121  However, the Texas district court—addressing White on 
remand—noted that “[p]olitical access is not a vapid phrase confined within 
a rigid formula, but is frequently perpetuated by mores, folkways, and cus-
toms.”122  It went on to look at many political and historical factors to de-
termine what multi-member districts were (or were not) constitutionally 
permissible.123 
  
 113. Id. at 756. 
 114. Id. at 765. 
 115. Id. at 768-69. 
 116. Id. at 769. 
 117. White, 412 U.S. at 766-69. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. 
 120. Chapman v. Meier, 372 F. Supp. 371, 377 (D.N.D. 1974). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Graves v. Barnes, 378 F. Supp. 640, 643 (W.D. Tex. 1974). 
 123. Id.  
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Because the doctrinal standard of dilution was “vague,”124 courts 
struggled to interpret just how to go about determining what actions consti-
tuted impermissible vote dilution.  In response to this uncertainty, the Fifth 
Circuit, sitting en banc, developed a list of non-exclusive factors—the 
“Zimmer factors”—that should typically be considered when determining 
whether an at-large election scheme has a racially discriminatory purpose or 
effect.125  According to the Fifth Circuit: 
[W]here a minority can demonstrate a lack of access to the process of slating can-
didates, the unresponsiveness of legislators to their particularized interests, a te-
nuous state policy underlying the preference for multi-member or at-large district-
ing, or that the existence of past discrimination in general precludes the effective 
participation in the election system, a strong case is made. Such proof is enhanced 
by a showing of the existence of large districts, majority vote requirements, anti-
single shot voting provisions and the lack of provision for at-large candidates run-
ning from particular geographical subdistricts.  The fact of dilution is established 
upon proof of the existence of an aggregate of these factors. . . .  [A]ll these factors 
need not be proved in order to obtain relief.126 
When the Zimmer opinion came before the Supreme Court in East 
Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, the Court avoided the constitu-
tional issue presented in the case and affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision 
on a narrow ground: that the district court’s equitable remedy of an at-large 
election was inappropriate. 127  The Court held that the district court should 
employ single-member districts “absent unusual circumstances.”128  The 
Court thus avoided ruling on whether a discriminatory effect was permissi-
ble, and whether the Zimmer factors were appropriately considered in de-
termining the discriminatory effect.  This state of uncertainty is reflected in 
lower court decisions. 
Between Whitcomb and City of Mobile v. Bolden129—a case where the 
Court drastically changed course with respect to its dilution jurisprudence—
forty-six district court cases addressed the constitutionality of multi-member 
districts and at-large elections.130  The first case to find a multi-member dis-
  
 124. See Equal Protection of the Laws—Reapportionment—Multimember Districting 
of County Governing Bodies May Work Unconstitutional Dilution of Minority Voting 
Strength—Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), petition for cert. 
filed sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 42 U.S.L.W. 3374 (U.S. Dec. 3, 
1973) (No. 861), 87 HARV. L. REV. 1851, 1856 (1974); id. at 1859 (“The decision of the 
Supreme Court in Regester to review the effectiveness of minority representation under 
[multi-member] schemes may ultimately be judged a prudent one only if subsequent cases 
apply an effectiveness test in some more predictable manner.”). 
 125. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973) (listing factors). 
 126. Id. (citation omitted). 
 127. 424 U.S. 636 (1976). 
 128. Id. at 639. 
 129. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
 130. These cases were found by running the following search in Westlaw: “403 U.S. 
124” or “412 U.S. 755.”  This search produced ninety-eight district court cases during the 
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trict constitutionally invalid was the district court decision in White v. Rege-
ster.131  Sixteen cases found multi-member districts or at-large elections 
invalid under the Federal Constitution, and twenty-one upheld the constitu-
tionality of the districts.132  All of the cases invalidating multi-member dis-
tricts were cases in the South—specifically, Alabama,133 Georgia,134 Louisi-
ana,135 Mississippi,136 and Texas.137  Before Zimmer was decided, district 
courts relied on a variety of factors and rationales to determine the validity 
of multi-member districts.  For instance, some cases focused the inquiry on 
access to the political process,138 another found it dispositive that the plan—
adopted by the court—was not designed to dilute minority votes,139 and 
another found it important that the multi-member district was not “too 
‘large.’”140  After Zimmer was decided, the lower courts consistently relied 
on the Fifth Circuit’s Zimmer factors for guidance,141 despite the fact that the 
Court refused to rule on the validity of these factors in East Carroll Parish 
School Board.142  Zimmer offered some much-needed guidance to lower 
courts, not the Supreme Court. 
The Court’s failure to provide any coherence in this area is not due to 
a lack of opportunity.  Only one year after the Court refused to offer guid-
ance on the relevant factors for dilution cases in East Carroll Parish School 
Board, the Court had another chance to lend clarity in United Jewish Or-
  
applicable time period, 1970 until April 22, 1980, the day Bolden was decided.  However, 
only forty-six of those cases dealt with the constitutionality of multi-member districts. 
 131. Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex. 1972), aff’d in part, rev’d in  
part sub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973). 
 132. One case upheld some of the multi-member districts it ruled on, but invalidated 
others.  Graves v. Barnes, 378 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Tex. 1974), vacated sub nom. White v. 
Regester, 422 U.S. 935 (1975). 
 133. Hendrix v. McKinney, 460 F. Supp. 626 (M.D. Ala. 1978); Brown v. Moore, 
428 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D. Ala. 1976); Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384 (S.D. Ala. 
1976); Yelverton v. Driggers, 370 F. Supp. 612 (M.D. Ala. 1974). 
 134. Paige v. Gray, 437 F. Supp. 137 (M.D. Ga. 1977); Paige v. Gray, 399 F. Supp. 
459 (M.D. Ga. 1975); Pitts v. Busbee, 395 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Ga. 1975). 
 135. Ausberry v. City of Monroe, 456 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. La. 1978); Parnell v. Ra-
pides Parish Sch. Bd., 425 F. Supp. 399 (W.D. La. 1976); Blacks United for Lasting Leader-
ship v. City of Shreveport, 71 F.R.D. 623 (W.D. La. 1976); Wallace v. House, 377 F. Supp. 
1192 (W.D. La. 1974); Beer v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1974) (adjudicating 
a case out of New Orleans, Louisiana). 
 136. Stewart v. Waller, 404 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Miss. 1975). 
 137. Lipscomb v. Wise, 399 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Graves v. Barnes, 378 F. 
Supp. 640 (W.D. Tex. 1974); Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex. 1972). 
 138. See, e.g., Kelly v. Bumpers, 340 F. Supp. 569, 584 (E.D. Ark. 1972). 
 139. Holt v. City of Richmond, 334 F. Supp. 228, 241 (E.D. Va. 1971). 
 140. Howell v. Mahan, 330 F. Supp. 1138, 1146 (E.D. Va. 1971) (quoting Connor v. 
Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692 (1971)). 
 141. See, e.g., Lipscomb, 399 F. Supp. at 789. 
 142. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). 
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ganizations v. Carey (UJO).143  The case was brought by a group of Hasidic 
Jews who alleged that the value of their votes was diluted when their com-
munity, which was contained within a single senate and assembly district, 
was “split” during a reapportionment to provide for a majority non-white 
district to comply with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.144  These facts 
provided the Court with an ideal vehicle to clarify its position about the 
nature of group rights engendered by the Regester opinion.   
Unsurprisingly, the Court declined to provide much needed clarity to 
this area of the law.145  The plurality opinion refrained from offering any 
commentary or clarity on the dilution claim.  Instead, the plurality focused 
on the fact that the redistricting presented “no racial slur or stigma with re-
spect to whites,” as there was no “fencing out of the white population from 
participation in the political processes of the county, and the plan did not 
minimize or unfairly cancel out white voting strength.”146  Again, the plural-
ity did not offer any meaningful guidance to lower courts on how to adjudi-
cate dilution claims.  The Justices, predictably, refused to compromise and 
neglected to develop the doctrine, other than through their individual com-
mentaries on the role of race and redistricting.147 
B. The Court Changes Course—Again 
Rather than provide clarity to this uncertain area, the Court only mud-
died the waters further in its next installment: City of Mobile v. Bolden.148  
Anyone looking for simplicity in this area came away sorely disappointed; 
the Justices spoke through the course of six separate opinions—the Justices 
could not even agree with one another, much less provide clarity within this 
area.  The setting was by now a familiar one.  In their complaint, the plain-
tiffs alleged that the multi-member system for the election of Mobile’s 
  
 143. 430 U.S. 144 (1977). 
 144. Id.  
 145. Note, United Jewish Organizations v. Carey and the Need to Recognize Aggre-
gate Voting Rights, 87 YALE L.J. 571, 576 (1978) (complaining that the Court declined “to 
resolve the uncertainties that persisted after Regester”). 
 146. United Jewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 165. 
 147. Tellingly, the doctrine remained in flux well into the 1990s, with Shaw v. Reno, 
509 U.S. 630 (1993), and its progeny.  In Shaw, the dissenting justices pointed to UJO for 
support, while the O’Connor majority looked elsewhere while dismissing UJO as outside the 
scope of these new facts.  Id. at 657-58.  The nature of aggregate rights remains both elusive 
and contested.  Of note, Professor Gerken published her influential criticism of the Court’s 
approach to vote dilution, Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 1665 (2001), almost 30 years after UJO.  The Court is either unaware of 
the central questions in this area, or simply unable or unwilling to resolve them.  That Shaw 
causes of action essentially disappeared after Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001), lead 
us to the conclusion that these questions are too difficult for the Court to handle. 
 148. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
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three-member City Commission diluted the voting strength of black voters 
in violation of both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  Following a bench trial, and while ad-
hering to the Whitcomb, White, and Zimmer line of cases, the district court 
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs,149 and the court of appeals affirmed the 
judgment in its entirety.150   
The Supreme Court reversed in a plurality opinion.151  In an opinion 
authored by Justice Stewart, the Court began its analysis by discarding the 
Zimmer formula.152  In its stead, the Court turned to the proper constitutional 
standards.153  In examining the three claims separately, the Court concluded 
at the onset that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act must be understood as 
codifying the command of the Fifteenth Amendment.154  As such, these two 
claims were merged into one.155  Then, when turning to the constitutional 
standard, the Court concluded that both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments must be understood to adopt the infamous intent standard.156  
Within the ambit of the Fifteenth Amendment, the Court offered its reading 
of Guinn v. United States, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, and the White Primary 
Cases for support.157  In light of recent case law, it may be said that the ar-
gument under the Fourteenth Amendment bore an easier burden; the Court 
offered here Wright v. Rockefeller, Washington v. Davis, White v. Regester, 
and Gaffney v. Cummings.158 
So understood, this analysis thus posed a relatively simple question: 
did the establishment and maintenance of the at-large system in Mobile date 
back to racial hatred and animus against black voters?  The district court 
answered this question affirmatively, on the strength of two factors: that no 
black had ever been elected to the city commission, and that city officials 
were unresponsive to the interests of black residents, or were at least less 
responsive than to the interests of whites.159  These two findings led the dis-
trict court to the conclusion that the system was invidiously discriminato-
  
 149. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 404 (S.D. Ala. 1976). 
 150. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238, 247 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 151. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 80. 
 152. Id. at 71. 
 153. Id. at 60-61. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 62. 
 157. Id. at 62-65 (citing Guinn v. United States, 236 U.S. 347 (1915); Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Terry v. Adams, 
345 U.S. 461 (1953)). 
 158. Id. at 66-69 (citing Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964); Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings, 
412 U.S. 735 (1973)). 
 159. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 402 (S.D. Ala. 1976). 
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ry.160  The court of appeals affirmed this judgment. 161  As we know, the Su-
preme Court disagreed.  Two points are worth discussing. 
First, the Court looked to the support provided by the district court for 
its inference of invidious discrimination.  The Court writes,  
The only indication given by the District Court of an inference that there existed an 
invidious purpose was the following statement: “It is not a long step from the sys-
tematic exclusion of blacks from juries which is itself such an ‘unequal application 
of the law . . . as to show intentional discrimination,’ . . .  to [the] present purpose 
to dilute the black vote as evidenced in this case.”162  
More specifically, the lower court, explained, “There is a ‘current’ 
condition of dilution of the black vote resulting from intentional state legis-
lative inaction which is as effective as the intentional state action referred to 
in Keyes.”163   To be sure, this is a cryptic sentence.  Perhaps, the Court 
means that the implementation of the at-large system at issue must be ex-
plained like the jury exclusion cases, only on racial grounds.  The Court 
concludes that this is not so, for such an “inference is contradicted by the 
history of the adoption of that system in Mobile.”164  Curiously, however, 
the Court offers nary a shred of evidence on this point.  All we have from 
the Bolden opinion is a passage early on when the Court simply asserted 
that the Alabama legislature authorized all large municipalities to adopt a 
commission as its form of government and required them to hold elections 
for such seats on an at-large basis.165  We also have a further passage in a 
footnote where the Court posits that “a system of at-large city elections in 
place of elections of city officials by the voters of small geographic wards 
was universally heralded not many years ago as a praiseworthy and progres-
sive reform of corrupt municipal government.”166  That is all.  Thus, when 
the Court concludes that the establishment of the at-large system in Mobile 
is devoid of a racial purpose, we must take the point on faith, not on the 
evidence. 
Second, the Court makes clear that simply pointing to the practice of 
multi-member districting and its deleterious effects on minority groups 
within them is not enough to meet the constitutional test.167  A plaintiff must 
offer more than the mere establishment of a facially neutral electoral prac-
  
 160. Id. 
 161. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238, 247 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 162. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 71 n.17 (1980) (plurality opinion) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 163. Bolden, 423 F. Supp. at 398 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 164. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 72 n.17. 
 165. See id. at 59. 
 166. Id. at 70 n.15 (citing E. BANFIELD & J. WILSON, CITY POLITICS 151 (1963); M. 
SEASONGOOD, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1933); L. STEFFENS, THE SHAME 
OF THE CITIES (1904)). 
 167. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 74. 
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tice.  Multi-member districts, the Court concludes, “are far from proof that 
the at-large electoral scheme represents purposeful discrimination against 
Negro voters.”168  This is a curious position to take in light of the previous 
point.  Put simply, the Court demands evidence from the plaintiffs in order 
to meet the exacting constitutional test, yet requires very little from the 
state.  Thus, this position is quite deferential to multi-member districts in 
general and their use.  The general history of the practice will not do, or the 
social context, or its effects over time.  Apparently, nothing short of a 
“smoking gun” will do. 
On remand, the district court “pieced together” the six separate opi-
nions, noting that “[f]ive justices agree, therefore, that this court and the 
court of appeals applied the wrong legal standard, although no majority 
agreed on the details of the correct standard.”169  The court also noted that 
“[o]ne of the six and the other three justices apparently held such purpose 
had been shown,”170 and determined that its “obligation” on remand was to 
“take additional evidence and evaluate that evidence and the record and 
make such additional findings as necessary to decide the issue of discrimi-
natory purpose (intent) under the proper standard.”171  The court did take 
additional evidence, namely a comprehensive history of the municipal gov-
ernment and statistical information related to the current electoral system in 
Mobile.   
The court pulled three principles from the Bolden line of cases: (1) “an 
intent to discriminate is a necessary element of a violation of the fourteenth 
and fifteenth amendments;” (2) “discriminatory intent need not be the sole 
purpose behind the challenged action;” and (3) “the decision maker must 
have ‘selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part “be-
cause of” not merely “in spite of” its adverse effects upon an identifiable 
group.’”172  From these principles, the court determined that it should in-
quire into the discriminatory purpose in the adoption of the at-large com-
mission system and whether the discriminatory system had adverse effects 
on the plaintiffs.173  The court, not surprisingly, found that “the principal 
motivating factors for the at-large election system for the Mobile City 
Commission was the purpose (intent) to discriminate against blacks, and to 
deny them access to the political process and political office. . . . [and] that 
the effects of this discriminatory intent continues [sic] to the present.”174  
  
 168. Id. 
 169. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050, 1053 (S.D. Ala. 1982). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1072 (internal citations omitted). 
 173. Bolden, 542 F. Supp. at 1073. 
 174. Id. at 1077. 
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The court, therefore, found that the at-large system violated both Section 2 
of the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.175 
One more doctrinal twist occurred in the Court’s dilution jurispru-
dence in Rogers v. Lodge,176 which was decided three months after the dis-
trict court addressed Bolden on remand.177  In Rogers, the Court upheld the 
intent requirement of Bolden, but also upheld a lower court’s finding that an 
at-large election scheme was unconstitutional because, while “racially neu-
tral when adopted, [it was] being maintained for invidious purposes” in 
violation of appellees’ Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights.178  This 
case might best be explained by pending congressional legislation, as it was 
decided two days after Congress legislatively overturned Bolden with the 
1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act.179 
C. Congress to the Rescue? 
The same year Rogers was decided, Congress overruled City of Mo-
bile and returned to the “effect” standard through its amendment to Section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act.180 The amendment prohibited electoral systems 
that resulted in vote dilution, regardless of the underlying purpose.181  Sec-
tion 2(b) provided that Section 2(a) is violated where the  
totality of circumstances [reveals] . . . that the political processes leading to nomi-
nation or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to par-
ticipation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its 
members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate 
in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.  The extent to 
which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or po-
litical subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That 
nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class 
elected in numbers equal to their participation in the population.182  
The purpose of the amendment was to return the state of the law to the 
Whitcomb, White, and Zimmer line of cases.183  In so doing, it cannot be said 
that Congress brought needed structure and clarity to the law.  After all, 
Congress sought to codify the case law prior to Bolden, so the earlier com-
plexities were bound to rise again.  Of greater interest for our larger thesis is 
  
 175. Id. 
 176. 458 U.S. 613 (1982). 
 177. Compare Roger v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (decided July 1st), with Bolden 
v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ala. 1982) (decided April 15th). 
 178. Roger, 458 U.S. at 622. 
 179. Armand Derfner, Vote Dilution and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 
in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 145, 160 (1989). 
 180. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id.  
 183. See Derfner, supra note 179, at 152. 
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what happened soon after the 1982 amendments.  Four years later, in 
Thornburg v. Gingles,184 a splintered Court sought to cabin the “totality of 
circumstances” inquiry by recasting the factors under the amended Section 
2 as a three-part evidentiary inquiry.185  The 1982 amendment to Section 2 
brought the Court’s dilution jurisprudence to an end, as cases are now 
brought under the much easier to prove “effects” test of Section 2 rather 
than the “purpose” test required by the Constitution.186  But as the Court 
began to interpret the amended Section 2, its penchant for disorder and 
chaos was also likely to arise as well.  As seen in the recent LULAC v. Per-
ry187 and Bartlett v. Strickland,188 uncertainty and confusion reign.  Put simp-
ly, the justices cannot help themselves. 
As the unpredictable jurisprudence in this area demonstrates, the Court 
has always behaved in an “interregnum-like” manner.  It was common for 
the individual Justices to express their independent views on representation, 
and it was ordinary for opinions to produce unclear results leaving lower 
courts to fend for themselves  The Court has always behaved this way with 
respect to the law of democracy and, as Gerken correctly notes, it continues 
to behave this way today.189  In our minds, this should lead us to at least 
question the Court’s role in regulating the law of democracy. 
III. TAKING STOCK OF THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 
Were the Court’s confused and haphazard approach to questions of 
minority vote dilution an isolated occurrence within this difficult area, we 
would not be writing this Essay.  But the reality is far from that.  We could 
choose from any sub-field within the law of democracy, from political190 or 
racial gerrymandering191 and the equipopulation principle,192 to campaign 
  
 184. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
 185. Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transfor-
mation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1833, 1850-53 (1992). 
 186. See, e.g., United States v. Blaine County, 363 F.3d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 2004) 
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 187. 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
 188. 129 S.Ct. 1231 (2009). 
 189. Gerken, Lost, supra note 10, at 505. 
 190. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 
(1986). 
 191. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 
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446 Michigan State Law Review [Vol. 2009:417 
 
finance193 or the Voting Rights Act.194  Any of these areas make clear that 
what we see in the minority-vote-dilution cases is not an exception.  The 
Court’s handling of the law of democracy does not inspire much confi-
dence.  
And so we come to what must be, by all accounts, the crux of the mat-
ter: as the Court regulates the political thicket as it does, mindful of neither 
consistency nor coherence, it is time to take stock of the field.  This final 
Part takes up this project.  The first section looks back to the debate between 
Justices Brennan and Frankfurter over the proper role of the Court in the 
field of politics.  This is a debate clearly reflected in our present debate over 
the Court’s approach to the law of democracy, between the structuralists 
and the individualists.  Justice Brennan, as we shall see shortly, moved the 
Court to adopt the individualist approach, while Justice Frankfurter offered 
a structuralist argument against judicial intervention.  In looking to this ar-
gument, we seek to recapture the context that led the Court to take on these 
difficult questions, as well as the obvious complexities that inhere within 
the law of democracy.  The second section looks to the future and asks 
whether the benefits of judicial intervention outweigh the costs.  
A. Justice Frankfurter v. Justice Brennan 
In Baker v. Carr, the U.S. Supreme Court confronted a question it had 
yet to decide in its history: whether the drawing of district lines presented a 
justiciable question under then-existing constitutional principles.195  Accord-
ing to those who stood against intervention—a camp that included, most 
prominently, Justice Frankfurter—this was a classic political question better 
left to the political branches to decide.196  Advocates of intervention unders-
tood this question as no different from many other questions the Court al-
ready adjudicated, while the problem presented was just as important.  Or as 
Anthony Lewis wrote in an influential 1957 article in the Harvard Law Re-
view,  
The Supreme Court has found special justification for judicial intervention to pre-
serve basic political liberties—of speech, press, assembly.  The right to fair repre-
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sentation can be of no less importance.  A vacuum exists in our political system; 
the federal courts have the power and the duty to fill this vacuum.197 
Writing for himself and five other Justices, Justice Brennan swept all 
difficulties aside and concluded that these questions fit comfortably within 
the Court’s traditional powers.198  None of the questions that troubled other 
Justices and commentators through the years proved too complicated for 
him.  The Court had jurisdiction, the case did not present a non-justiciable 
political question, and the lower courts would be able to fashion relief if it 
determined on remand that constitutional violations existed.199  This case 
was no different from anything else the Court did.200  The fact that his opi-
nion covered sixty-five pages of the U.S. Reports betrayed his confidence.  
Or as Justice Clark began his concurring opinion, in reference to the mul-
tiple opinions accompanying Justice Brennan’s, “One emerging from the 
rash of opinions with their accompanying clashing of views may well find 
himself suffering a mental blindness.”201  This was not an easy case, and 
Justice Brennan could not wish it so. 
One move in particular remains with us and deserves special mention. 
In discussing whether plaintiffs had standing to bring forth their claims in 
federal court, Justice Brennan concluded as follows, “The injury which ap-
pellants assert is that this classification [under review] disfavors the voters 
in the counties in which they reside, placing them in a position of constitu-
tionally unjustifiable inequality vis-à-vis voters in irrationally favored coun-
ties.”202  The injury in question, according to Justice Brennan, was an injury 
to voters as individuals.  Let us repeat this point lest the reader miss its im-
portance: in refusing to apportion the state to accommodate changes in pop-
ulation, the state action in question injured voters as individuals.  To live in 
a malapportioned district was to sustain a constitutionally cognizable injury, 
an injury that the federal courts were equipped to handle. 
Justice Frankfurter disagreed with every one of these arguments.  We 
focus on two arguments in particular.  On the question of injury, Justice 
Frankfurter explained—in our minds correctly—that this was not a case 
where plaintiffs were claiming a private injury to their interests.203  To be 
sure, that was what they pled, but that was not what this case was about.  As 
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he wrote, “the discrimination relied on is the deprivation of what appellants 
conceive to be their proportionate share of political influence.”204  After all, 
he continued, the plaintiffs are able to both exercise their right to vote and to 
have their votes counted.  And so the plaintiffs’ real objection was to the 
state’s adoption of a “basis of representation with which they are dissatis-
fied.”205  In other words, the plaintiffs were asking the Court to choose a 
different basis of representation from what the state had chosen, to impose a 
different theory of political philosophy from the one chosen by the state and 
its representatives.206  This was the essence of the litigation in Baker v. Carr.   
Justice Frankfurter ultimately had the better argument once the early 
disparities in representation lessened.  At a time when the population dispar-
ities were as much as 41 to 1, as seen in the Reynolds litigation, it was easy 
to argue that voters in malapportioned districts had what amounted to no 
vote at all.  The injury was so obvious to the naked eye that the Court could 
easily deploy the language of individual rights and get away with it.207  But 
once the Court’s intervention had its desired effect, Justice Frankfurter’s 
argument gained greater currency.  Once the original injury lessened, sub-
sequent judicial intervention required sharper and more fine-tuned distinc-
tions about how we wish to structure our democratic institutions.  This is 
true of ballot access cases or the regulation of political parties, of political 
gerrymandering or the wrongful districting cases.  These are cases about 
what role the political parties should play in our political system, about the 
proper level of political power for persons of color, or the fair way to divide 
seats in a legislature.208  These are not issues of individual rights, but the 
proper structure of our democratic process. 
Justice Frankfurter also disagreed on the question of standards.  Recall 
that Justice Brennan found this issue simple enough to dismiss with a casual 
reference to the “well developed and familiar” standards under the Equal 
Protection Clause.209  Dissenters and commentators alike wished for the 
Court to delineate specific standards for redistricting cases, but the Court 
was content to only go as far as to offer the “arbitrary and capricious” stan-
dard.210  This was no answer, according to Justice Frankfurter.  His answer 
is worth quoting at length: 
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Apportionment, by its character, is a subject of extraordinary complexity, involv-
ing—even after the fundamental theoretical issues concerning what is to be 
represented in a representative legislature have been fought out or compromised—
considerations of geography, demography, electoral convenience, economic and 
social cohesions or divergencies among particular local groups, communications, 
the practical effects of political institutions like the lobby and the city machine, an-
cient traditions and ties of settled usage, respect for proven incumbents of long ex-
perience and senior status, mathematical mechanics, censuses compiling relevant 
data, and a host of others.211 
This is clearly right as far as it goes.  But as Justice Frankfurter con-
tinued, how would a judge evaluate this amalgam of factors under equal 
protection principles?  Or, in his words, “these are not factors that lend 
themselves to evaluations of a nature that are the staple of judicial determi-
nations or for which judges are equipped to adjudicate by legal training or 
experience or native wit.”212  And he was surely right about that.   
His point bears repeating only because of what came next.  As he 
wrote about these factors and the impossibility of choosing among them, the 
difficulties were all the more challenging “because in every strand of this 
complicated, intricate web of values meet the contending forces of partisan 
politics.”213  More to the point, matters of this kind involved questions of 
pure politics.  This was an important point in two ways.  First, these were 
matters that would ultimately affect future election results.  The Court must 
interfere with these issues cautiously.  Second, these were “overwhelmingly 
party or intra-party contests.”214  As the Court decides to enter this terrain, it 
must tread only too carefully; for once it begins to take sides in these politi-
cally-charged controversies, the line between politics and law begins to 
blur.   
B. Should the Court Simply Go Away? 
The lessons of the debate between Justices Frankfurter and Brennan 
are clear.  Justice Frankfurter advocated for a cautious approach, an ap-
proach respectful of politics and deferential to compromises reached else-
where.  This view recognizes that the Court cannot do all things and must 
protect, first and foremost, the one asset it does have: its legitimacy.  This is 
why Justice Frankfurter focused on the many reasons why the Court should 
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not intervene when confronted with the refusal by state legislatures to re-
draw its district lines for many years.  In contrast, Justice Brennan took a far 
more expansive view of the Court and its powers.  This was a view of the 
Court as an engine of social change, as a muscular institution that could 
solve all problems, large and small.  In this way, the redistricting cases were 
no different from anything else the Court was willing to do.   
Understood this way, both camps were partly right and partly wrong.  
Justice Brennan was undoubtedly correct that the Court could handle these 
cases and impose its vision of equality upon the states.  The states hardly 
put up a fight, and the better question at the time was in trying to explain 
why the states acquiesced as readily as they did.215  But Justice Frankfurter 
was also correct that the Constitution offered the Court no firm guidance for 
handling these cases.  Making matters worse, he recognized that the law of 
democracy was full of complex questions of structure devoid of easy an-
swers.  This is why we see the chaos that we do in these cases from the time 
of Baker v. Carr.  As the Court makes its way through the famed thicket, 
and the Justices face these difficult questions, constitutional principle gives 
way to idiosyncratic answers to the problems presented.  This is true about 
the gerrymandering cases, interpretations of campaign finance laws and the 
Voting Rights Act, ballot access, and vote dilution cases.  Among all the 
factors at issue, how is the Court to choose among them? 
Looking to the future, the question at the heart of the law of democra-
cy asks us to take sides on this debate.  The contemporary answer is clear 
enough: most scholars side with Justice Brennan and offer their preferred 
theories of choice.  The leading accounts argue for judicial adoption of a 
“political competition” value216 and the enforcement of core equality 
rights.217  Our favorite account offers a theory of “Constitutional pluralism,” 
which encourages the Court to “utilize democratic principles to direct its 
interpretation of the Constitution.”218  This is a defense of judicial review in 
defense of “core democratic principles.”219  These theories all share a com-
mon view of the Court as muscular and aggressive.   
We do not offer a theory of our own.  Instead, our point is that in of-
fering our preferred theories of choice we run directly into the objections 
raised by Justice Frankfurter.  Professors Pildes and Issacharoff, two of the 
leading structuralists of our generation, implicitly concede as much.  As 
they write,  
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[F]or an emerging field seeking to build on the Warren Court’s initial, critical en-
gagement with the deep, structural features of democratic institutions, the central 
question is how deep into existing practices a robust, functional, historically-aware 
understanding of democracy will penetrate.  “Elections” can look legitimate with 
full access and fairly counted ballots.  But what ideas about social life and political 
representation should inform the antecedent and far more decisive questions of 
whether elections are conducted through cumulative voting, proportional represen-
tation, or the longstanding but hardly examined American tradition of single-
member, winner-take-all elections in geographic districts?  Or whether within 
democratic bodies, decisions should be reached with minority vetoes, with consoc-
iational requirements of concurrent majorities, or with simple majority rule?220 
This passage is reminiscent of Justice Frankfurter’s complaint we quoted 
earlier about the difficulties that inhere to the task of redistricting.221  The 
point then, as it is today, is whether the Court can distinguish among all 
these factors, and whether we would want it to.   
First, consider the argument by Professors Issacharoff and Pildes that 
the Court should enforce a value of political competition.  The obvious first 
question asks where this value comes from.  Its answer is disarmingly sim-
ple:  
The way to sustain the constitutional values of American democracy is often 
through the more indirect strategy of ensuring appropriately competitive interorga-
nizational conditions.  It is in this way that central democratic values, such as res-
ponsiveness of policy to citizen values and effective citizen voice and participation, 
are best realized in mass democracies.222   
This is a view of judicial intervention grounded in democratic theory and of 
the Justices as democratic engineers.  Justices Frankfurter and Harlan re-
sponded to this argument in their dissents in Baker; as they argued, this is 
nothing short of choosing one argument over another and asking the Court 
to choose “among competing theories of political philosophy.”223  In so 
doing, this view “reflects more an adventure in judicial experimentation 
than a solid piece of judicial adjudication.”224  This is another way of saying 
that this view asks the Court to take sides in these controversies in accor-
dance with the Justices’ own preferences about the proper structure of our 
government.  Recall in this vein the objections raised by Justice Frankfurter 
about the myriad values and choices reflected in this area that the Court is 
forced to confront.  Some Justices might prefer “responsiveness” as the cen-
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tral democratic value; yet others might choose political stability instead.225  
How is a Court to choose among them?226 
To be fair, Issacharoff and Pildes concede that the Court need not be 
the one institution that enforces this important value.  Yet they conclude that 
no other institution is likely to fill this void.227   
The argument for enforcement of core equality rights faces similar dif-
ficulties.  The argument here is that the Court should focus its attention in 
protecting core equality rights and leave contested rights to the vagaries of 
the political process.  As a theoretical matter, the argument can be as persu-
asive as one wishes it to be, but the details soon get in the way.  To the 
question of how a Court would decipher what these core equality rights are, 
Professor Hasen offers two answers: these are the basic rights essential to a 
contemporary democracy,228 or else, looking to the future, these are also the 
rights that are the product of “social consensus.”229  We set aside for purpos-
es of this argument his enumeration of these basic essential rights and hap-
pily concede that limitations on the right to vote on the basis of “gender, 
literacy, national origin, race, religion, sexual orientation” and wealth be-
long on that list.230  We also agree that states must not place unreasonable 
burdens on individuals wishing to organize with others for political purpos-
es.  Hasen writes that this is a “small universe” of rights.231 
We are more curious about the basis for these rights.  Hasen argues 
that these rights have been socially constructed; thus, he argues that any 
other rights must achieve core status through a similar process of social 
consensus.232  The problem then becomes obvious: how is a court to know 
when a right achieves social consensus?233  This question is particularly im-
portant in light of Hasen’s admission that the history of the Court’s political 
equality jurisprudence shows that “there has been no distinction between the 
justices’ views of the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause and what the 
Constitution requires.”234  Or as he states more forcefully a few sentences 
later, “[a]t least in the area of political equality, there is little question that 
  
 225. See generally Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144 (1986) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973). 
 226. The same point applies to Professor Charles’ model of constitutional pluralism.  
See Charles, supra note 73. 
 227. See Pildes, supra note 220, at 1611; Samuel Issacharoff, Oversight of Regulated 
Political Markets, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 97 (2000). 
 228. See HASEN, supra note 5, at 79-80. 
 229. Id. at 80-81. 
 230. Id. at 82. 
 231. See id. at 79. 
 232. Id. at 80-81. 
 233. See Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Of Platonic Guardians, Trust, and Equality: A 
Comment on Hasen’s Minimalist Approach to the Law of Elections, 31 J. LEGIS. 25, 32-33 
(2004). 
 234. HASEN, supra note 5, at 158. 
Summer] Leaving the Thicket at Last? 453 
 
justices of the Warren Court (like the justices of the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts that followed) have ‘made it up’ as they went along.”235  And so, the 
question becomes, why should we assume that the notion of social consen-
sus will cabin the Court’s decisionmaking in any noticeable way?  
As we discuss these contrasting theories of judicial decision-making in 
the law of democracy, we return to Justice Frankfurter one final time.  Note 
first that both theories wish for the Court to take a limited and limiting ap-
proach in this area.  Yet, in the end, they return us to the place where Justice 
Frankfurter began.  How to choose from the many factors from which a 
Court must necessarily choose?  In light of the history of the Court in this 
field, it is hard to trust the Court to regulate this important field.    This must 
mean, at the very least, that argument for less intervention, or any interven-
tion at all, must at least be taken seriously. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s handling of the law of democracy is not worthy of much 
praise.  It is haphazard, confused, and messy.  Recent scholarship either 
tries to explain this messiness and incoherence as a strategy to buy the Court 
time until a new and stable majority emerges, or else scholars retrieve the 
world they know best, where normativity is the norm and they offer their 
judicial theories of choice.  We do neither.  Rather, we contend that what we 
witness today is not new but the way the Court has handled the field of de-
mocracy from the moment it intervened in Baker v. Carr.  As a result, we 
go back to Baker and the debate between Justices Frankfurter and Brennan 
over the wisdom of judicial intervention.  In our minds, this is a debate with 
a clear winner: to this day, Justice Frankfurter’s forceful argument has gone 
both unheeded and unanswered.  The evidence is in, and so, after forty years 
of judicial review in the realm of politics, the question for the future should 
be whether judicial intervention in the realm of politics is worth the cost.   
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